The African Military Industrial Complex

Building Africa’s own security capacity

The military-industrial complex has been a recurring feature of dominant states. These states have invested heavily in the development of weapons and other war-making capabilities. Although such investments are often presented as defensive, these capabilities have also been used to initiate and prolong conflicts.

Arms transfers reveal a persistent imbalance. Most major weapons move from a small group of industrial exporters to weaker importing states. Between 2020 and 2024, the United States accounted for 43 percent of global major-arms exports. France, Russia, China, and Germany were the other leading exporters. Africa accounted for about 4.5 percent of global arms imports, while sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.2 percent. African imports declined by 44 percent compared with 2015 to 2019, although imports by West African states roughly doubled.[oecd]

This pattern does not mean that Africa is the main destination for the global arms trade. It does show that many African states remain dependent on foreign suppliers for major military platforms, spare parts, technical support, and upgrades.

This raises an important question. Why have African states not invested more consistently in locally developed and locally sourced security solutions?

The answer is not that African countries have made no attempt to develop defence industries. South Africa has produced artillery, armoured vehicles, missiles, aircraft, and mine-resistant vehicles. Egypt operates large military production facilities and assembles armoured vehicles, small arms, aircraft, and drones, often under licence. Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan also maintain state or private defence production capacity. However, the continent remains heavily dependent on imported or licence-built major systems. No African company appears in the global top 100 defence companies, despite African military spending reaching approximately $58 billion in 2025.[stylemanual.gov]

This dependence has consequences. When critical defence capabilities are sourced externally, national security becomes partly a function of financial resources and political relationships. An aggressor with deeper pockets may be able to sustain operations for longer, particularly when both sides depend on external supplies of ammunition, spare parts, and replacement equipment.

There are also other well-documented forms of external control. Export customers may depend on foreign laboratories, authorised software, classified mission data, spare parts, depot maintenance, and technical support. The F-35 programme illustrates this dependency. Foreign customers cannot independently conduct all testing outside the continental United States, and mission data files are produced in US facilities. The United Kingdom requested its own laboratory on two occasions and was refused. A customer may continue flying aircraft using the last authorised file, but it cannot operate with the same level of capability after access to updates, support, or classified data is withdrawn.[uis]

This is a significant strategic limitation. A state does not need to be remotely disconnected from its weapons to become vulnerable. It may be enough for the supplier to restrict software updates, spare parts, repairs, technical assistance, or access to essential data.

Designing for local conditions

Locally developed defence systems can offer important advantages, especially when they are designed around local terrain, climate, maintenance capacity, and operational needs.

The Sahel demonstrates this clearly. Armed groups linked to JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel have used large motorcycle formations to move quickly across tracks and difficult terrain. These tactics allow fighters to attack, disperse, and withdraw before heavier forces can respond. State forces have also adopted motorcycles. Heavier imported vehicles often faced delays because spare parts and maintenance support were unavailable.[ucd]

The lesson is not that imported equipment is always ineffective. It is that equipment must match the environment in which it will operate. In the Sahel illustration, performance is dependent not only on armour or firepower but also on mobility, fuel use, repairability, communications, and the ability to operate far from established bases.

The same principle applies across deserts, forests, savannahs, and urban areas. A platform designed for another climate or logistical system may perform poorly when local forces lack the tools, training, fuel, or spare parts needed to sustain it. Further its costs are double edged, in the first instance price is externally set and in the second jobs opportunities are lost. The supply of capability is as a result externally controlled and diminished.

This is why insurgencies frequently establish themselves in remote areas. Such locations are difficult to patrol, costly to supply, and poorly served by roads and communications. Without solutions that reduce the cost and increase the coverage of security, a nation is perennially vulnerable to homegrown and foreign interdiction.

The cost of local innovation

Governments often purchase foreign equipment because it is faster than developing a domestic alternative. When armed groups are already attacking towns and military positions, a government usually does not have the time or budget to build a defence industry from the ground up.

That decision can be practical in the short term. Over time, however, it creates a security system dependent on a foreign technical and industrial base. The supplier can influence the system by controlling maintenance, ammunition, software, upgrades, training, and replacement parts. This is playing out in the Ukraine conflict where gradually the Ukrainian side has been forced to develop more of the hardware it needs to address the conflict since external assistance has proven intricate. For the African nation the message is clear when it comes to war and national defence you cannot rely on anyone, either now or going forward.

When looking at the concept of independence and sovereignty, continuing without a credible domestic military industrial complex (MIC) is a recipe for eventual undoing. Decades of development can be wiped out overnight by a well thought out and reasonably funded insurgency. Primarily because the insurgent has the motivation and the freedom to innovate making do with what is, not trying to retrofit northern hemisphere tactics to southern hemisphere, terrain, culture and climate.

To deliver the MIC requires investment in research institutions, universities, technical training, manufacturing, testing facilities, and secure data systems. All this alongside a well architected public data system that enables entrepreneurs to engage meaningfully in the space. The open data aspect cannot be underestimated. Accurate GIS and other data provide builders in the space opportunities to overlay different data types together in support of a particular combined arms solution. The point here being that with fewer resources it becomes imperative to empower those with the will, and inspiration to contribute in what is a very sensitive space. The key benefit to understand is that local innovation and production means local jobs, new technology and an improved local economy.

To see how this might look like in practice, consider the work done by Iran in the development of the Shaheed drone. Whilst not entirely locally sourced, the munition was locally innovated, developed and assembled, providing the nation with a simple yet devastatingly effective instrument.

The important lesson is not that Iran achieved complete self-sufficiency. It is that local design, assembly, adaptation, and production can preserve a high degree of capability under difficult international conditions. Further, domestic production creates skills, jobs, and repair capacity that cannot be disrupted so easily. In short the deeper pockets advantage of the enemy is lost if not greatly reduced.

To understand how positive for a nation MIC can be, the US defence industry shows the wider economic effect of a mature industrial base. In 2024, the US aerospace and defence sector generated approximately $995 billion in business activity, including about $439 billion in indirect supply-chain activity and more than one million supply-chain jobs. The economic value comes from the wider network of manufacturers, engineers, software companies, maintenance providers, and research institutions, not only from the final weapon system.[smex]. This activity equates to approximately 3% of US GDP

For African economies seeking to reduce conflict while limiting external influence, this industrial dimension matters. A locally developed system can support security objectives while strengthening technical education, manufacturing, employment, and economic resilience.

The political risks

Local defence production also carries serious risks. Many African states contain political, ethnic, or regional divisions. Some communities seek greater autonomy, while others contest the legitimacy of the central government. A stronger domestic security industry could therefore be used against the same populations it was intended to protect.

This risk is especially important where institutions are weak, civilian oversight is limited, and security forces operate without effective legal accountability. Building local military capacity without building accountable political institutions could increase repression and intensify internal conflict.

Colonial borders remain part of this problem, but the greater part stems from ethnic differences and the clash between development and chronic under development. These manifest in projects of national interest being reserved dependent on either political or ethnic affiliation as opposed to the most beneficial solution for the nation.

A strategic choice

The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo shows how quickly instability can become more difficult to contain when armed groups receive advanced external support. M23 captured Goma in January 2025. UN experts reported Rwandan command influence, the presence of several thousand Rwandan troops in eastern Congo, and equipment beyond the normal inventory of a lightly armed rebel group. This included air-defence systems, anti-tank missiles, and GPS interference that affected Congolese drone operations.[capipedia.cap]

The case demonstrates that the problem is not simply that rebels acquire better weapons. It is that external support can provide training, intelligence, command systems, and specialised equipment that change the balance of power.

Africa therefore needs a stronger capacity to design, produce, maintain, and govern its own security systems. This does not mean that every country must build fighter aircraft, submarines, or large armoured formations immediately. It means that states should identify the capabilities most relevant to their own terrain and security problems, then develop domestically supplied solutions in those areas.

Buying foreign weapons can provide an immediate response to a crisis. It cannot, by itself, provide long-term strategic independence. A state that depends entirely on foreign suppliers remains exposed to sanctions, political pressure, supply interruptions, software restrictions, and changes in the priorities of external powers.

Waiting for other countries to develop the next generation of military technology and hoping to purchase it later is not a strategy. It is a form of hope and the poorest kind. It is hope that one day those who actually sell the weapons that you are using never decide to openly challenge you, because in global politics necessity will always trump morality.

References

• Aerospace Industries Association. Data on US aerospace and defence business activity and supply-chain employment.

• African Economic History Network and related American Political Science Review research. Studies of African borders, precolonial political frontiers, and colonial boundary formation.

• Africa Defense Forum. Reporting on motorcycle formations and military mobility in the Sahel.

• Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Analysis of mobility, maintenance, and equipment use by Sahelian forces.

• BBC. Reporting on UN expert findings concerning M23, Rwandan forces, and advanced military equipment in eastern Congo.

• Conflict Armament Research. Component analysis of Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones.

• Pentagon F-35 Joint Program Office. March 2025 statement concerning the absence of a remote kill switch.

• SIPRI. Arms Transfers Database and fact sheets covering global arms transfers in 2020 to 2024 and 2021 to 2025.

• United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Reports on M23, foreign military support, command structures, and military equipment.

• Wall Street Journal. Reporting on Shahed drone supply chains and restrictions applied to HIMARS supplied to Ukraine.

• Washington Post. Reporting on Ukrainian officials’ statements concerning US confirmation of targeting coordinates.